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ABSTRACT 
Competition in the European airline industry is currently fierce in the face of 
depressed demand conditions, and in the wake of privatizations and liberalization. 
The Portuguese flag carrier, TAP Air Portugal, operates within this environment. It 
is a medium sized carrier that was part of the defunct Qualiflyer Group alliance and 
has recently joined the Star Alliance. It controls more than 50% of the air market 
between Europe and Brazil and Europe and Angola. Nevertheless, it has been 
experiencing financial losses. One reason for this is that, following the reasoning of 
Ronald Coase (1946), it is difficult for any company with decreasing average costs 
to recover full costs in a highly competitive market. One way of approaching the 
problem is to establish quasi-monopoly power and airlines have done this through 
such things as frequent flyer programs and hub-and-spoke operations. Other 
airlines, notably charter carriers, have sought to adjust capacity and services to meet 
an anticipated cash flow. In practice, many have used a combination of measures 
with mixed success. This paper focuses on how TAP has responded to changing 
conditions by adjusting its supply-side activities in terms of restructuring its 
network to maximize potential revenues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade competition between airlines in Europe has been 
fierce. There have been important structural changes within the industry, and 
within the actors that participate in it. Some older companies such as Sabena 
and Swissair could not meet the challenges, while others such as Air France 
and KLM have sought some respite in merging. At the other extreme, several 
of the no-frill carriers such as easyJet and Ryanair have earned steady profits 
and subsumed some of their competitors. The changing networks of services 
being offered by air carriers in Europe has inevitable implications for spatial 
economic development and impacts on key industries such as tourism. Here 
we examine changes that have taken place in the network of TAP Air 
Portugal. 
TAP is medium sized European carrier with about 38 aircraft in its fleet 
and is entirely state owned.1 It is the primary airline in one of the European 
Union’s peripheral areas. It was for awhile a member of the now defunct 
Swissair led Qualiflyer Group alliance and it joined the Star Alliance in 
2004. Its financial situation is poor with large losses being experienced, 
although in 2003 it did make a marginal operating profit (€12 million on a 
turnover of €1144 million, but embedded in the accounts was a one-time 
gain of €20 million from the sale of shares in French Telecom and a write-
back for a tax court case in Brazil), the first in many years.2 Despite this, in 
2004 it sought a loan guarantee for €400 million from the Portuguese 
government. 
A major location problem is that its main hub, Lisbon Airport, is located 
on the western extreme of Europe, away from the main economic growth 
centre of European Union and thus unsuited to be a major strategic hub. 
Portugal is a long thin country that is not ideal for domestic hubbing. 
However, external to Europe, TAP does control over 50% of the air transport 
market between Europe and Brazil, and between Europe and Angola. This is 
the result of the exploitation of bilateral government agreements on these 
markets, and the legacy of Portugal’s colonial past. 
There are a plethora of business models that have been applied to the 
airline industry. The concern here is with the strategy that TAP has adopted 
to improve its market position at a time when many other carriers of 
comparable size have found survival difficult. Public ownership obviously 
helps, although the advantage is now diminished, but the concern here is 
                                                 
1  ICF/Button (2003) offers a categorization of European Union airlines.  
2  This is also after receiving $1,100 million in restructuring grants in 1994 
designed to allow the airline to become commercially viable. 
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with the structural changes that the company has made to reduce is long-
standing cash outflows.  
There is a basic problem encountered by firms in all industries that have 
committed costs (in this case a commitment to a scheduled service) and that 
has been recognized since the pioneering works of Edgeworth (1881), Coase 
(1946), Telser (1978), and others. In a fully competitive environment it is 
impossible to recover full costs in this situation of declining average cost. 
Full costs can only be recovered if either the concern receives a subsidy (and 
that, Coase correctly points out, is, irrespective of any distributional 
concerns, going to impose an excess efficiency burden elsewhere in the 
economy) or by somehow gaining a degree of market power and extracting 
economic rent from customers. TAP has in the past enjoyed state subsidies 
but these are no longer acceptable under EU legislation, and hence there has 
been the need for a re-examination of how costs may be recovered. 
THE MARKET SETTING 
The demonstration effects of the outcome of the U.S.’s 1978 Airline 
Deregulation Act experience stimulated changes elsewhere, although 
reforms in Europe tended to be more gradual, with a liberalized market 
within the European Economic Area akin to that of the U.S. domestic market 
only emerging in 1997. One reason for these more gradual changes was it 
mainly entailed reaching agreement on international air services between 
member states, rather than being an entirely internal matter as with the U.S. 
Countries such as France, Spain and Greece, where domestic aviation is 
relatively important, have a tradition of heavily regulating entry and fares, 
and this extended to their views of international aviation policy in Europe. 
There was also a pervasive philosophy that air transport serves public needs 
and that to ensure adequate provision and to avoid the economic distortions 
of monopoly power, state ownership best served the public interest. The 
problem was that these countries with well-entrenched systems of market 
controls, even if appreciative of the probable adverse implications of this for 
the overall welfare of the EU, still sought to cushion their airlines from 
competition.  
Reform of the European internal airline market materialized as a series 
of steps. Initially these were largely ad hoc measures brought about by 
judicial interpretations of EU laws, but a series of packages of reform 
followed (Button, 2004). The First Package in 1987 made the existing 
bilateral air service agreements (ASAs) more flexible. The Second Package 
passed in 1990, alleviated capacity sharing and market access, and largely 
removed governments’ role in setting airfares for international services 
within the EU. The Third Package, adopted in 1991, initiated a phased move 
that, by 1997, resulted in a regulatory framework similar to U.S. domestic 
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market. With the EU, it provided protection against national discrimination 
in airline licensing, eliminated capacity sharing, and allowed for a phased 
introduction of cabotage by 1997. 
More recently, the EU Commission has switched its attention to the 
relationship between EU air transport policy and EU external relations 
(Mencik von Zebinsky, 1996). The traditional right of governments to 
negotiate bilateral air service agreements with non-EU states has been 
brought into question. The EU Commission was given permission in 1996 to 
negotiate on behalf of all EU countries on soft issues regarding aviation.  
The growth of strategic alliances, and the adoption by many member states 
of the Open Skies bilateral ASA with the U.S., more recently led in 2003 to 
the EU Commission gaining approval to negotiate transatlantic agreements 
on behalf of the EU with the intent of ultimately creating a single U.S./EU 
air transport market. 
AIR CARRIERS’ REACTION AT THE EUROPEAN 
LIBERALISATION 
The outcome of all these reforms is that the competition faced by 
scheduled EU airlines has increased considerably. The latter stages of 
reforms also coincided with weak economic growth on the part of many 
European economies combined with exceptionally depressed air travel 
demand as the combined result of the September 2001 attacks on New York 
and Arlington, the Gulf conflict, and SARS. The emergence of no-frill 
carriers such as Ryanair at the lower end of the market have added to long 
standing competition from charter carriers, whilst in some markets there are 
now, generally subsidized, high-speed rail services. 
The schedule airlines thus face a major problem. They commit to a 
schedule and then attempt to raise enough revenue to cover the costs 
involved; there is a fixed cost to be recovered. In a monopoly situation this 
poses few problems, capacity is limited and premium fares can be charged to 
recover costs, to earn an economic rent, or to enjoy inefficiency. But as 
Coase and others have pointed out, if there is competition, then airlines will 
compete fares down to short-run marginal costs.3 They may all thus enjoy a 
high load factor, but not recover sufficient revenues to meet their long run 
financial outlays.4  
                                                 
3  Similar problems can also emerge if the market is contestable–—see 
Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982, for the conditions where this pertains. 
4  Indeed, whist virtually all the members of the Association of European 
Airlines were experiencing severe financial problems in 2003 their load fatctors had 
risen to an avearge of 73.4% from factors in the low 60% in the late 1990s when they 
were at least covering their opertating costs. 
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To overcome this, some airlines received subsidies, but EU regulations 
now largely prevent this. An alternative is to adopt measures within 
competition laws that allow for the creation of some degree of market power, 
even if it is only short term.5  
Non-pricing factors have been one way airlines have tried to create 
quasi-market power. This has included variations in in-flight and pre/post 
flight services, as well as scheduling and type of aircraft differentiation. 
More recently, there have been attempts, led by no-frill carriers, to unbundle 
services allowing customers to choose the portfolio of services they prefer. 
The difficulty is that ultimately Hotelling (1929) effects seem to exert 
themselves, with a trend towards meeting the preferences of the median 
passenger. 
The advent of computer reservation systems (CRS) and the growth of 
travel agents provided an initial advantage to individual airlines over both 
competitors and customers. This allowed segmentation markets and dynamic 
price discrimination systems in the form of yield management.6 Legal 
actions on both sides of the Atlantic, however, limited the ability of airlines 
to exploit this, and now technology changes, especially the World Wide 
Web, have weakened any CRS effect that may exist.7  
Retaining customer loyalty offers not only more revenue, but also a 
more predictable flow of revenue and the ability to adjust assets accordingly. 
Enhanced information systems allowed carriers to develop as part of their 
yield management strategy frequent flyer bonuses that went to their loyal 
customers. Frequent flyer loyalty has been dissipated, however, as it has 
become more difficult to reclaim miles—a fact one would anticipate from 
the basic premise that carriers seek to maximize payload at marginal cost. In 
some countries, such as Germany, frequent flier miles are also now taxed. 
Mergers, franchises, and alliances have occurred with the aim of 
offering a superior service through such things as code-shares, common 
frequent flyer programs, common airport lounges, and more coordinated 
scheduling. Sheer size is sometimes seen as an advantage because of the S-
curve effect—after a threshold is reached, the share of a market rises faster 
than an airline’s (or alliance’s) share of the capacity (Fruhan, 1972). The 
                                                 
5  Not all would agree that market power is needed but argue that there are 
gaming solutions (e.g., Levine, 2002) but this begs a number of questions and may 
ultimately revolve around how monopoly power is used rather than market power per 
se.  
6  If the objective of the company was to simply recover costs then Ramsey 
Pricing would be adopted, but airlines are profit-maximizing entities and will seek 
pricing strategies that maximize rent. 
7  It has also led to a very considerable decline in the number of travel agents 
in the U.S., although less so in Europe National Commission to Ensure Consumer 
Information and Choice in the Airline Industry (2002). 
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difficulty has been that airline companies vary considerably in their 
managerial styles and ethos, making it problematic to gain the full benefits 
of such unions.  
Some European carriers have benefited from operating in multiple 
markets. They enjoy a degree of quasi-monopoly power in some markets 
because potential existing competitors are reluctant to compete fearing 
retaliation in other markets where they were the incumbent dominant carrier 
(Edwards, 1955). This possibility has been reduced as no-frill carriers have 
emerged with no legacy services to protect and thus with nothing to lose 
from piece-meal route entry.8 
Vertical integration may also be used for cost recovery. The larger value 
chain reveals that while European airlines have been making large losses 
over the business cycle since liberalization, many upstream elements in the 
chain have not (Button, 2004). Airports, global distribution systems, airport 
services, airframe manufacturers, and others have consistently made 
relatively high returns. These upstream inputs operate in much less 
competitive conditions than the airlines. Attempts by airlines at capturing 
some of this upstream rent are increasing. In the U.S., airlines have 
combined to create Orbitz to compete with the four large global distribution 
systems, and Opodo is gradually growing as a European counterpart. 
Companies like Ryanair in the EU have sought to extract some of the 
economic rent enjoyed by airports. 
There can also be other changes on the supply-side and airlines’ route 
networks can also be used to extract rent for full cost recovery. The initial 
successes in the U.S. came when airlines adopted hub-and-spoke systems 
(Oum & Tretheway, 1990) that generated network economies of scope and 
density on the cost side and economies of market presence on the revenue 
side (Levine, 1987). A structure similar to the hub-and-spoke system existed 
in Europe prior to liberalization with bilateral ASAs restricting routes to the 
flag carrier of each country, and services to their main airport. Radial 
networks were thus common, but airlines were unable to fully exploit their 
potential benefits because of a lack of fare and capacity setting freedoms, 
and the frequent requirement to revenue pool. Post deregulation has seen 
only small changes, mainly because congestion limits flexibility. 
Airlines, when confronted with losses, are also forced to look at their 
cost structures. While it may be correct that, in a highly competitive 
environment, falling average costs result in an inability to recover costs, the 
situation is exacerbated if costs are not being minimized. European airlines 
have seen the emergence of no-frill carriers that have removed some costs 
from their operations and significantly reduced others. The traditional 
                                                 
8  Dresner (2004) offers conformation of this theory in the context of the U.S. 
domestic airline market. 
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carriers have followed this example. In the end, however, if there is truly a 
decreasing costs issue then relative costs will only determine which carriers 
remain in the market, rather than the overall viability of the market.9 
While the general pattern of events following the deregulation of air 
transport in Europe has been studied, and no-frill carriers have attracted 
some interest,10 analysis of individual European scheduled carriers is scant 
and what has been done has tended to look at those that failed to survive in 
the new competitive conditions (e.g., Suen, 2002). Equally, changes in 
network structures have only received limited attention. 
TAP AIR PORTUGAL 
TAP Air Portugal was founded in 1945 by the Portuguese government 
and was regarded as the extension of Portugal abroad and as a way to get 
closer of the rest of the Portuguese Empire. The first commercial European 
route was established in September 1946 and the first non-European route to 
Luanda in December. Seven years later TAP was privatized. Meanwhile the 
number of destinations increased without any defined overall strategy. The 
first route to Brazil was inaugurated in 1961, and 10 years later the first route 
to North America (Montreal.). In 1974 came the Portuguese revolution that 
ended several decades of dictatorship. A program of nationalization that 
included TAP Air Portugal in 1975 followed this.  
The Portuguese government has recently sought to privatize TAP but a 
proposed purchase of 34% of the company in 2001 by Swissair fell through 
when the latter went bankrupt. A firmer legal commitment to gradually 
privatize was legislated in 2002, and a more modest proposal to sell 51% of 
its handling division emerged in 2003. This initially entailed the 
establishment of a new company—Serviços Portugueses de Handling 
(SPdH)—which began operations in October 2003 with the short term intent 
that TAP would retain a 94% stake and the private PGA-Portugália Airlines 
have 6%. TAP itself remains a publicly owned airline. 
TAP is a small to medium sized carrier, with a fleet in 2004 of 38 
airplanes.11 It is a mixed carrier providing European and intercontinental 
services. It is essentially a carrier that focuses its attention on meeting the 
                                                 
9  As the American economist Frank Knight (1921) once said, “Costs merely 
register competing attractions.” 
10  For example there is a widely held view that no-frill carriers have been a 
universal success. In fact only Southwest in the U.S. and Ryanair in Europe have 
consistently made profits, and both enjoyed first-mover advantage. A significant 
nuber of no-frill carriers on both sides of the Atlantic have surcome to commercial 
pressures. 
11  In terms of passengers, carried TAP ranked 13th amongst Association of 
European Airlines members and 12th by passenger kilometers. 
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demands of its regional market although this region extends geographically 
well beyond the boundaries of Portugal, although not throughout Europe 
(ICF & Button, 2003). TAP offers a more limited geographical coverage 
than the large global carriers such as British Airways or Lufthansa, although 
it does serve a range of major airports.12 The carrier has a significant 
intercontinental coverage, but because of the bilateral ASA structure, and the 
large-scale movements of Portuguese nationals to specific markets, it focuses 
on intercontinental services to Brazil and Angola. Table 1 offers some 
current comparisons with a sample of the other legacy carriers in Europe. 
Table 1. Number of passengers, passenger kilometeres and available seat kilometers of 
selected EU carriers, 2003 
 
 
Airline               Passengers Passenger kilometeres Available seat kilometers 
                          (thousand) (million) (million) 
 
Air France            43490.3 99073.8 131647.6 
Alitalia                 22244.7 31254.2 43564.5 
Austriamn              6895.1 14537.5 20386.6 
British Airways    34815.4 100425.7 137843.3 
Finnair                    5672.3 8653.3 13815.2 
Iberia                    24669.8 41957.6 55926.2
KLM                    18719.2 56540.6 72409.6 
Lufthansa             44463.3 96616.8 124166.0 
Olympic                 5105.1 6083.6 9720.3 
SAS                      20456.5 23020.3 33332.7
TAP                        5633.7 12011.5 16836.5 
 
Source: Association of European Airlines. (2004). Yearbook  2004. Brussels.  
 
 
Normally carriers like TAP are either alliance members to gain the 
advantages of scope, density, and market coverage that this brings, or have a 
range of code-share agreements on a route basis with other carriers. 
Although TAP was involved in the European Qualiflyer alliance and has 
now joined the Star Alliance, more recently it pursued the path of multiple 
code shares with second tier carriers (e.g., with bmi, Finnair, Iberia, 
Olympic, and SN Brussels). However, because of its focus on particular 
regions (both intra-Europe and intercontinental), there tends to be limited 
network-based competition in many of its intercontinental markets. Indeed, 
TAP is a near monopolist European carrier for many of its Brazilian 
                                                 
12  In 2003 TAP served 36 destinations, 7 in Portugal, 15 in the rest of Europe, 
and 14 beyond Europe. As a benchmark, British Airways serves 153 destinations 
with 76 beyond Europe. 
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destinations (which comprise 33 flights a week and contribute about 20% of 
its revenue). There is much tougher competition on busier continental 
(although this is to some extent constrained by code-share agreements), and 
some denser intercontinental routes.  
TAP has not traditionally been a highly efficient airline. For example, 
looking at the total factor productivity of 41 airlines from around the world 
in 1983, Windle (1991) found that TAP came 38th (and 12th of the 14 
European carriers included). In terms of unit costs measure it came 29th.  
Analysis of 1992-1995 data by Ng and Seabright (2001) shows that whilst 
the carrier had the third lowest cost for cockpit crew and fifth lowest for 
cabin crew of the 12 EU carriers studied, its labour productivity in terms of 
million revenue passenger kilometres per employee was the second lowest, 
and less than half of that of U.S. carriers which overall outperformed the 
European airlines.  
The recent performance of the carrier has seen a steady rise in patronage 
(from just over 3 million passengers in 1990 to nearly 5.5 million in 2002). 
Parallel growth in available seat kilometres in the 1990s led to a fairly static 
load factor of around 60%. As deregulation has allowed greater fare 
flexibility and enhanced competition stimulated lower prices, load factors 
have risen since 2002 to something over 70% (compared to 73.4% for 
Association of European Airlines carriers as a whole in 2003). In terms of 
financial results (Figure 1), however, TAP has not done well, although there 
is some indication of improvement in the last few years.  
The interest here is the extent to which TAP has sought to recover more 
of its costs, and also contain those costs, through manipulation of its route 
network. This network comprises unregulated intra-European Economic 
Area routes and ASA regulated intercontinental services. This manipulation 
offers the potential for the exploitation of economies of density and scope 
whilst extracting additional consumer surplus from the monopoly elements 
of the network. An element of fixed cost recovery is thus theoretically 
possible. 
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Figure 1. TAP net financial results, 1995-2003 
Source: Data was compiled from TAP Annual Reports, 1995-2003.  
 
TAP AIR PORTUGAL’S NETWORK 
With significant governmental protection, little competition and 
guaranteed coverage of financial losses, the nationalized TAP Air Portugal 
had not traditionally been excessively worried about its efficiency. Its labour 
productivity, and productivity in general, was low even compared to other 
state owned European flag carriers. Some of the difficulties were simply due 
to poor internal management, but one of the problems was route structure. 
After 45 years, the network of TAP (see Figures 2a to 2d) represented a 
piece-meal of routes without any clear perspective or orientation. A decade 
or so ago, there was limited evidence of flight concentrations in a hub-and-
spoke structure as we now understand it. Moreover, non-European routes 
often involved stopovers, or some very circuitous routings, that reduced cost 
efficiency and the attractiveness of the services to potential users. The 
European network involved duplication of several services and in some cases 
there was a triplication of flights to the same destination from several 
Portuguese airports. No Portuguese airport had a clearly dominant role as a 
hub.  
-140000000
-120000000
-100000000
-80000000
-60000000
-40000000
-20000000
0
20000000
40000000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
60 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
 
Figure 2a. TAP European network in 1990 
 
Figure 2b. TAP South American network in 1990 
 
Figure 2c. TAP North American network in 1990 
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Figure 2d. TAP African network in 1990 
 
However, with the onset of European Union liberalisation process in 
mid-1990s, combined with the beginning of the downturn in the world 
economic situation, and especially the European situation,  from the late 
1990s, TAP began to make very significant loses that clearly required some 
form of major structural adjustment. The government’s restructuring grant 
offered some prospect for change, but was largely used to cover short-term 
deficits and to expand the already gangly route network. In 1997 the 
company was still operating with a mixed fleet of Boeing, Airbus, and 
Lockheed aircraft and thus forgoing the economics of synergy that 
accompany fleet standardization. Demand was down, and was unlikely even 
in an economic upturn to be as vibrant as in the mid-1990s. And there was 
new competition to face in Europe—by 2000 the no-frill carriers were 
supplying 600,000 seats a year, up from virtually zero five years before, and 
the trend was irrepressibly upwards. The low cost, no-frill carriers although 
still predominantly focusing on UK rooted services were expanding their 
networks across Europe. 
The European TAP service network that existed in 2000 (see Figures 3a 
to 3d) had changed little over the unstructured form of a decade earlier. 
Elsewhere, TAP had made some changes. The rather volatile South 
American routes had seen a notable expansion of services, the African 
network had been increasingly concentration on flights from Lisbon Airport, 
and the longest haul North American routes had been abandoned. 
Nevertheless, the networks continued to involve numerous stopovers, 
routings were often circular, and there remained duplication of flights from 
different Portuguese cities. 
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Figure 3a. TAP European network in 2000 
 
 
 
Figure 3b. TAP South American network in 2000 
 
 
Figure  3c. TAP North American network in 2000 
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Figure 3d. TAP African network in 2000 
 
 
In the face of this, and with the reality of EU rules now preventing 
further explicit government subsidies, the concept of the flag carrier was 
effectively passé. TAP was forced to radically rethink its philosophy.13 
Management soon understood that the airline was unable to compete head-on 
with the major European carriers such as British Airways, Lufthansa, and 
Air France, because it simply did not enjoy the massive economies of scale 
and scope they did, nor did TAP have the domestic feeder traffic. Its fleet 
was also unsuitable to this task. Portugal is also located on the periphery of 
the EU, far way from the largest markets and the most vibrant economies. 
Establishing even a medium size, stand-alone hub in these conditions is not 
viable.  
Thus, TAP had to find alternative solutions. Portugal has tended to 
enjoy good relationships with several former colonies such as Brazil and 
those in Africa. The bilateral ASA agreements, coupled with the problems 
that airlines of these countries encountered, effectively gave TAP substantial 
de facto monopoly power in these intercontinental markets. Many of the 
routes involved were also unattractive to the larger European airlines 
because they did not fit conveniently in their network structures and their 
domestic feed was limited. Long-haul routes also have the advantage that 
demand tends to be less fare elastic (Gillen, Morrison & Stewart, 2002) and 
                                                 
13  The rethink coincided with the appointment of a Brazilian as chief 
executive officer, Fernando Pinto, that effectively removed the airline from 
traditional Portuguses political ties and moved it towards commercial management. 
64 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
 
they tend to attract a larger number of business class fare paying passengers 
(Button, 2004).14 
In 2001 (see Figures 4a to 4d) only small changes to the TAP route 
service structure of a decade earlier were visible, but by 2002 (see Figures 5a 
to 5d) significant changes were beginning to emerge. The total number of 
routes offered, together with the number of destinations served, was 
beginning to fall with indirect and longer routings all but eliminated and 
replaced by direct ones. Moreover, there was a clear concentration of 
services on a Lisbon hub and with this came an elimination of duplicated 
long-haul flights. For example, Porto lost a number of services. These 
changes, combined with a modest macroeconomic upturn in several of the 
countries served by TAP, and a range of internal cost cutting measures, 
brought about a modesty upturn in the company’s financial performance. 
Figure 4a. TAP European network in 2001 
 
                                                 
14  Even in cases where there are no restrictive bilateral ASAs the traditional 
carriers tend to face less threat of competition from low cost carriers partly because it 
is more difficult to enjoy the high crew and aircraft utilization rates that no-frill 
airlines seek. This is not to say that low cost operations are absent from deregulated 
long-haul routes, indeed Laker Airways in the late 1970s may be seen as a pioneering 
venture in low cost airlines. 
 Button, Costa, and Reis 65 
 
 
Figure 4b. TAP South American network in 2001 
 
Figure 4c. TAP North American network in 2001 
 
Figure 4d. TAP African network in 2001 
 
66 Journal of Air Transportation  
 
 
Figure 5a. TAP European network in 2002 
 
Figure 5b. TAP South American network in 2002 
 
Figure 5c. TAP North American network in 2002 
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Figure 5d. TAP African network in 2002 
 
The current TAP route service network (see Figures 6a to 6d) is similar 
to that of 2002. Lisbon Airport is the major hub in the system with a network 
of European flights (including code shares that are not shown) feeding a 
range of intercontinental destinations in South American and Africa. At the 
non-European end of routes, it has began domestic services in Mozambique 
to feed its long-haul routes and in 2005 plans to relocate its Africa hub to 
Angola—it is currently in Johannesburg. The European network has 
remained dramatically simplified even as some European economies have 
begun to recover. Costs have also been contained as the airline has moved to 
standardize its fleet on Airbuses (its last Boeing leaving service in 2002) and 
to reduce its labour force. 
Figure 6a. TAP European network in 2004 
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Figure 6b. TAP South American network in 2004 
 
Figure 6c. TAP North American network in 2004 
 
Figure 6d. TAP African network in 2004 
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The relative concentration on direct services has been pushed furthest in 
its long-haul markets as can be seen in Figure 7. Basically, TAP changed the 
structure of its network over a 4-year time span to focus on what it considers 
to be its profit centres, where it enjoys a degree of monopoly power, and to 
provide feeder traffic to those centres. Joining the Star Alliance offers the 
other members of the group complimentary services to South America and 
Africa and Portuguese feed to their own service networks.  
Figure 7. The evolution of the TAP Air Portugal network 
Source: Data was compiled from TAP Annual Reports, 1990-2004. 
It provides the potential for TAP to feed more traffic from a number of 
European catchments areas into its South Atlantic and African routes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The new institutional environment in the EU has brought about 
significant changes in the conditions confronting the management of the 
region’s scheduled airlines. Although the change has been phased-in, unlike 
that which affected U.S. domestic carriers in the late 1970s, the reaction of 
many of the incumbent flag carriers has often been slow. Inertia has been the 
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common feature and restructuring has generally been slow and reactive to 
crises rather than representing a proactive management philosophy. In part 
this can be explained by the reluctance of some governments to appreciate 
that a European Single Market entails just that; it means competition, 
commercialization, and free entry. Those entrenched in the airline industry, 
both on the management and labour sides, have often lacked vision about 
what the new conditions entail, and it has been left to newcomers such as 
Ryanair and easyJet to meet the demands of customers.  
The incumbent EU airlines’ initial response to the rigors of the market 
was to emulate their U.S. counterparts that had experienced two decades of 
competition. Sophisticated yield management regimes were introduced, 
frequent flyer programs were initiated, existing hub-and-spoke networks 
were further developed, and alliances were joined. As with their U.S. 
cousins, however, these measures have not protected all from heavy financial 
losses and, in some cases, bankruptcy. The importance of network 
configurations, however, has tended to be overlooked in the literature in this 
field, but is beginning to be appreciated on both sides of the Atlantic. In 
Europe, British Airways, for example, has moved towards a focus on long 
haul activities, and the chairmen of both Delta and United have stated their 
intent to do the same. These airlines, however, have the advantage of scale 
and a tradition of commercial management to define their strategies; other 
carriers often have neither. 
TAP has had the particular handicap of 100% state ownership, relatively 
small size, and a disadvantageous, peripheral-market location. It has thus 
experienced serious financial problems. Coase’s (1946) arguments, in 
particular on cost recovery in a decreasing average cost, competitive industry 
now seem difficult to refute in the context of TAP. The only way full costs 
are likely to be recovered in these circumstances is through ad hoc efforts to 
minimize fixed costs and to seek some market advantage, however short-
lived, wherever possible. The examination of TAP Air Portugal’s 
manipulation of its route structure provides some insights into the way one 
carrier seems to have bought itself some breathing time. It has focused its 
energies on longer haul routes where demand tends to be less elastic and 
competition from no-frill carriers is likely to be less intense.  The beautiful 
thing about markets, however, is that they are never still. Whether the TAP 
route restructuring offers a one-year respite or one of longer duration is not 
clear (and, indeed, should not be clear in a market) but certainly, as past 
experience has shown, good management should already be looking for new 
strategies now that it is within the Star Alliance to cope with the next crisis. 
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